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Mike Madden*

Equal, but only Conceptually: Explaining the
Phenomenon of Religious Losses in
Contemporary Canadian Constitutional Cases
Involving Conflicting Rights

If there is no hierarchy of rights in Canada, then why does freedom of religion so
often seem to lose in cases of conflicts with other rights? This article discusses
five recent Canadian cases (involving same-sex marriages, controversial medical
practices, the wearing of a niqab, and a Christian university’s sexual conduct
policy) in order to expose how the courts regularly characterize freedom of religion
as being conceptually equal to other rights, before ruling against freedom of
religion on the facts of the particular cases. This phenomenon within Canadian
rights jurisprudence is then justified within the article by reference to a new
combination of insights drawn from legal and liberal political theory. Specifically,
the article suggests that religious freedom losses in the five cases can be justified
because of considerations relating to (1) Rawlsian public reason, (2) third-party
harms and dignitary harms, and (3) the special significance of emerging and
emancipation rights. Thus, freedom of religion is only equal to other rights at a high
level of abstraction; in its application, it is regularly subordinated to other rights in
ways that can be defended where one or a combination of the three enumerated
considerations is present.
S’il n’existe pas de hiérarchie des droits au Canada, alors pourquoi la liberté
de religion semble t-elle si souvent perdante en cas de conflit avec d’autres
droits? Dans cet article, nous examinons cinq affaires canadiennes récentes
(concernant des mariages entre personnes de même sexe, des pratiques
médicales controversées, le port du niqab et la politique relative à la conduite
sexuelle dans une université chrétienne) afin d’exposer comment les tribunaux
caractérisent régulièrement la liberté de religion comme étant conceptuellement
égale aux autres droits, avant de statuer contre la liberté de religion sur les faits
de ces affaires particulières. Dans l’article, on justifie ce phénomène que l’on
observe dans la jurisprudence canadienne en matière de droits par une nouvelle
combinaison d’idées tirées de la théorie juridique et de la théorie politique libérale.
Plus précisément, l’article suggère que les pertes de liberté de religion dans les
cinq cas peuvent être justifiées par des considérations relatives à (1) la raison
publique rawlsienne, (2) les préjudices causés aux tiers et à la dignité, et (3) la
signification particulière des droits émergents et d’émancipation. Ainsi, la liberté de
religion n’est égale aux autres droits qu’à un haut niveau d’abstraction; dans son
application, elle est régulièrement subordonnée à d’autres droits d’une manière
qui peut être défendue lorsqu’une ou une combinaison des trois considérations
énumérées est présente.
*
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Introduction
In 2010, I argued that freedom of religion tends to get the “short shrift”
in Canadian jurisprudence, and that this right seems to occupy a place
that is “second among equals” within the landscape of Canadian rights
and freedoms.1 I made this argument2 notwithstanding the fact that the
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has unequivocally stated that there is no
hierarchy of rights3 under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(Charter).4 However, after studying more recent religious freedom cases
1.
Mike Madden, “Second Among Equals? Understanding the Short Shrift that Freedom of Religion
is Receiving in Canadian Jurisprudence” (2010) 7:1 JL & Equality 57.
2.
Ibid.
3.
See Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, [1994] 3 SCR 835 at para 75, 120 DLR
(4th) 12 [Dagenais]; see also Reference Re Same Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79 at para 50.
4.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
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from the last ten years (and after then re-reading older cases with a fresh
perspective), I have recently begun to suspect that my previous work
mischaracterized the conceptual manner in which freedom of religion is
viewed by Canadian courts. This article therefore represents an effort to
(1) clarify my previous—and perhaps somewhat inadequate—explanation
of how freedom of religion is treated in Canadian case law, and (2) go
one step further by suggesting how the treatment that freedom of religion
actually receives from Canadian courts is justified in principle.
Before considering several specific cases that illustrate tendencies in
Canadian religious freedom law since 2010, Part I of this article introduces
the general concept of proportionality as a justification for limiting
rights in Canadian constitutional law.5 In Part I, I ultimately suggest that
Canadian proportionality frameworks are legitimate general frameworks
for resolving cases wherein rights are in tension with one another.
Part II then describes five important Canadian rights-conflict cases
since 2010,6 each of which applies some form of proportionality approach,
and ultimately suggests that freedom of religion must yield to the other
rights that are at stake in those cases. These cases continue to reinforce
the SCC’s claim that freedom of religion occupies a place of conceptual
equality alongside other Charter rights, while nonetheless demonstrating
that unrestricted exercises of religious rights cannot be permitted in the
cases because of the harms that such exercises would cause to the Charter
rights or values of others in society: religion is, in a sense, equal-butsubordinate.
Part III then points to several considerations that may justify this
phenomenon. I begin by demonstrating how acceptance of public reason
theories will cause many of the factors that would otherwise favour
freedom of religion in proportionality assessments to be excluded from
the assessments. Additionally, consideration of other factors such as thirdparty harms, dignitary harms, and the importance of promoting emerging
or emancipation rights, will each tend to weigh against freedom of religion
in specific cases where this right is in conflict with other Charter rights
or values.
5.
See generally Charter, supra note 4, s 1; R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 26 DLR (4th) 200
[Oakes]; Dagenais, supra note 3 at paras 76-77; R v Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76 at paras 29-33 [Mentuck];
Doré v Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12 [Doré]; and, Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney
General), 2015 SCC 12 [Loyola].
6.
Marriage Commissioners Appointed Under The Marriage Act (Re), 2011 SKCA 3 [SK Marriage
Reference]; R v NS, 2012 SCC 72 [Niqab Case]; Kisilowsky v Manitoba, 2018 MBCA 10 [MB
Marriage Case]; Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 [TWU
BC]; and, Christian Medical and Dental Society of Canada v College of Physicians and Surgeons of
Ontario, 2019 ONCA 393 [ON Physician Case].
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Ultimately, this article argues that freedom of religion is a right that
properly benefits from a full measure of protection from Canadian courts at
an abstract level, but that certain considerations that are unique to religious
freedom cases today will regularly require freedom of religion to yield
when this right comes into conflict with other Charter rights, for reasons
that can be defended and accepted on rational theoretical grounds. In other
words, even though freedom of religion often, if not overwhelmingly,
tends to “lose” in contemporary contests of competing Charter rights, this
outcome is justifiable by reference to concepts of proportionality, public
reason, and harms, all of which have accepted and established roots in
Canadian constitutional jurisprudence and/or in legal and political theory.
I.

Utilitarian proportionality: The model for justifying limits on rights
and resolving conflicts of rights
In order to establish the necessary building blocks for subsequent Parts of
this article, I begin in this Part by discussing the general framework that
is almost universally used for identifying permissible limitations on rights
and for resolving competing rights claims: the proportionality framework.
The goals of this Part are to illustrate (1) how proportionality-based
reasoning is applied by Canadian courts, (2) where proportionality finds
its philosophical roots, and (3) why proportionality represents a legitimate
basis for resolving rights claims. Subsequent Parts of this article will then
look more closely at specific Canadian religious freedom cases involving
proportionality assessments (Part II), and the theoretical justifications that
can be marshalled in support of the outcomes of these cases (Part III).
1. Limiting and reconciling competing rights—Canadian jurisprudence
The Canadian Charter explicitly recognizes that the rights and freedoms
contained therein are not absolute.7 The multi-part test that has been used
to determine what limits on rights are demonstrably justified was first
articulated by the SCC in R v Oakes,8 and it has remained substantially
unchanged through its applications over decades of cases.9 Under the Oakes
test, the government, in justifying a limit on a Charter right, must prove
that there is a pressing and substantial objective for the infringing measure
or law.10 Next, the government must prove that the infringing measure
does not interfere with rights in a disproportionate manner while pursuing
the pressing and substantial objective.11 There are three components to
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Charter, supra note 4, s 1.
Supra note 5.
See e.g. Ontario (Attorney General) v G, 2020 SCC 38 at paras 71-76.
Oakes, supra note 5 at para 73;
Ibid at para 74; Ontario (Attorney General) v G, supra note 9 at para 71.
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this latter proportionality analysis: (1) the infringement must be rationally
connected to the government’s objective, (2) the infringing law must not
impair Charter rights any more than is reasonably necessary, and (3) “the
benefits of the infringing measure [must] outweigh its negative effects.”12
If the government can prove all of these elements of the Oakes test on a
balance of probabilities, then the government’s limit on a Charter right
will be demonstrably justified, and therefore constitutional.
Initially, the Oakes test was the only general framework used for
considering whether government action that infringed upon Charter rights
was constitutional. However, in Doré v Barreau du Québec,13 the SCC
set out a subtly different approach for assessing the constitutionality of
government action in an administrative law context. The SCC determined
in that case that, where a discretionary decision of a government actor
engaged a Charter right or value, courts should assess the original decision
by way of a “proportionality analysis consistent with administrative law
principles”14 rather than through a direct application of the Oakes test. In the
context of a decision that encroaches on Charter rights or values, however,
the decision will only be reasonable if it reflects a proportionate balancing
of the applicable Charter rights and the underlying statutory mandate
of the administrative decision-maker.15 Although the Doré framework
may appear to be different in substance from the Oakes framework,
the SCC has attempted to dispel this perception in several decisions by
characterizing the new framework as being functionally equivalent to the
Oakes framework.16 While there is certainly room to debate the extent to
which such characterizations are accurate, and to wonder about the utility
of applying two different frameworks to different forms of Charter-based
claims depending on how they arise,17 it is most important to note for the
purposes of this article that both frameworks essentially focus on the same
types of cost-benefit proportionality assessments, even if other aspects of
the frameworks are somewhat different.
The SCC has also crafted a slightly different, third approach to be used
specifically in cases involving direct conflicts between different Charter

12. Ibid.
13. Supra note 5.
14. Loyola, supra note 5 at para 3.
15. Ibid at para 32.
16. Doré, supra note 5 at para 5; see also Loyola, supra note 5 at para 40; and see TWU BC, supra
note 6 at para 80.
17. See e.g. Christopher D Bredt & Ewa Krajewska, “Doré: All That Glitters Is Not Gold” (2014) 67
SCLR (2d) 339; see also Audrey Macklin, “Charter Right or Charter-Lite? Administrative Discretion
and the Charter” (2014) 67 SCLR (2d) 561.
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rights. This approach was initially articulated in Dagenais18 in the context
of publication bans and consists of the following steps: first, determine
whether there is a true conflict of rights that cannot be resolved by some
form of accommodation or reasonable alternative measure that avoids the
conflict;19 however, if accommodation will not prevent the conflict, then
determine whether the salutary effects of protecting one right outweigh the
deleterious effects that would be inflicted upon the other right.20 In other
words, the second part of the Dagenais approach requires courts to assess
whether the benefits to one right are greater than the harms to the other
right. In this sense, the Dagenais approach seems to be identical to the
proportionality-of-effects analysis that makes up the final component of
the Oakes test,21 and to the proportionate balancing of applicable Charter
rights that takes place within a Doré analysis.22 All three approaches seem
to involve the same type of cost-benefit calculations.
2. Utilitarianism and proportionality—underlying theory in support of
the Canadian rights resolution frameworks
Broadly speaking, we might classify all of the above proportionality
analyses as being utilitarian or consequentialist in nature. Utilitarianism is
a normative ethical theory that takes many forms, and that seeks to answer
questions about what is right in a particular situation by assessing what will
do the most good for the most people; it is a value-maximization theory
concerned with promoting the greatest global extent of benefits while
minimizing the greatest global extent of harms.23 Consequentialism is a
broader umbrella term for a family of normative ethical theories (including
utilitarianism) that are concerned with judging the moral rightness of an
act only on the basis of the consequences that the act produces.24 In this
sense, consequentialism can be distinguished from another major family
of normative ethical theories—deontological theories—which suggest
that human actions should be guided not so much by the consequences
18. The approach was subsequently endorsed and restated in slightly different terms in Mentuck,
supra note 5, and then again in the Niqab Case, supra note 6.
19. Dagenais, supra note 3 at paras 76-77.
20. Ibid.
21. See Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37 at paras 72-78 [Hutterian
Brethren].
22. See e.g. Loyola, supra note 5 at para 32.
23. See generally Julia Driver, “The History of Utilitarianism” in Edward N Zalta, ed, Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab, 2020), online: <plato.stanford.
edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/> [perma.cc/EN22-6QW6].
24. See generally Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Consequentialism” in Edward N Zalta, ed, Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab, 2020), online: <plato.stanford.
edu/entries/consequentialism/> [perma.cc/P3DQ-26RN].
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that the actions will produce, as by the conformity of the actions to moral
norms and standards.25
Classical utilitarian theory can be traced predominantly to two
philosophers who published their theories during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries—Jeremy Bentham26 and John Stuart Mill.27 According
to Mill, “the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number,
is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is
to prevent harm to others.”28 This harm principle starts from the premise
that liberty is a good that ought to be maximized, but then acknowledges
that one’s exercises of individual liberty can cause harm to others—and
in such cases, there is justification for placing limits on individual liberty.
Although Mill does not state his harm principle in a classically utilitarian
way (i.e., if the harm to others outweighs the benefit from a particular
exercise of liberty, then that liberty should be restricted), it seems clear
that such a formulation could have been implied within Mill’s work.
Mill subsequently published an entire treatise on utilitarianism some
two years later, which made explicit his consequentialist normative ethical
approach.29 The approach that Mill takes in this treatise has arguably
been adopted by the SCC in Oakes, Doré, and Dagenais in the Court’s
requirements for proportionality analyses that weigh benefits and harms
as a means of resolving rights claims.30 Some of the more generally
widespread influence of utilitarian philosophers on judges of the SCC
has been noted elsewhere: McCormack’s study of SCC citations of
philosophers shows that Mill and Bentham are the two most frequently
cited philosophers by Canada’s apex court, accounting for more than 120
of the 543 citations to philosophers that had been observed within a study

25. See generally Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, “Deontological Ethics” in Edward N Zalta,
ed, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab, 2020), online: <plato.
stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/> [perma.cc/KAB5-VZJQ].
26. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Garden City:
Doubleday, 1961) (originally published in 1789).
27. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed by Roger Crisp (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998)
(originally published in 1861); see also, John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed by Edward Alexander
(Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1999) (originally published in 1859).
28. Mill, On Liberty, ibid at 51–52.
29. Mill, Utilitarianism, supra note 27.
30. Elements of utilitarian thought are overlappingly present in both the second (minimal impairment)
and third (proportionality of effects) parts of the Oakes test (supra note 5). Both steps of the test weigh
the extent of harm done in order to achieve either a government objective (minimal impairment) or
other societal benefits (proportionality of effects).
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of all SCC cases between 1860 and 2016.31 In light of this heavy influence
of utilitarian thinkers upon the SCC, it is perhaps not surprising that the
Court has adopted a utilitarian proportionality framework for resolving
rights cases.
There are probably also pragmatic reasons why the SCC relies upon
different variants of utilitarian proportionality tests for determining the
permissible limits of Charter rights. These tests emerge from cases
involving real-world problems that are presented to the Court for
adjudication. The Court does not have the option in every case to simply
“pass” on the difficult questions that the cases require them to answer,
so judges must develop a normative and practical analytical approach to
answering the questions. While different philosophical, ethical, and moral
approaches might all have allure for different reasons, many of these
approaches (e.g., deontological approaches that are grounded in religious
conceptions of morality) would likely be illegitimate for courts to draw
upon, given the religiously neutral or secular role that courts, and other
branches of government, are expected to play within Canadian society.32
Utilitarianism, however, remains accessible to a religiously neutral
court; as Driver notes, “[t]he question Bentham asked, ‘What use is it?,’
is a cornerstone of policy formation. It is a completely secular, forwardlooking question.”33 In this sense, a utilitarian proportionality approach
may represent the most acceptable option for a secular court.
Additionally, utilitarianism avoids creating the problem of having
courts pronounce upon what is (morally) Right—a determination that is
probably more contentious than one wherein a court pronounces upon
what is good or beneficial in a particular case.34 Utilitarianism avoids the
kind of morally absolute propositions that seem to pervade deontological
theories, in a way that may help courts to adjudicate in more minimalist
(and therefore potentially more publicly acceptable) ways.35
31. Nancy McCormack, “When Canadian Courts Cite the Major Philosophers: Who Cites Whom in
Canadian Caselaw” (2017) 42:2 Can L Libr Rev 9.
32. On the constitutional requirement for state neutrality in matters of religion in Canada, see
generally Mouvement laïque québécois v Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16.
33. Driver, supra note 23.
34. Bradley Miller, “Proportionality’s Blind Spot: ‘Neutrality’ and Political Philosophy” in Grant
Huscroft, Bradley W Miller & Grégoire Webber, eds, Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights,
Justification, Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 377: “A proportionality
test is thought to serve the purpose. Instead of having to dispute contested questions of political
philosophy, judges could instead focus on a discrete set of technically worded inquiries.”
35. On the benefits of judicial minimalism, see Cass Sunstein, “Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided” (1996) 110:1 Harv L Rev 4 at 8: “Courts should try to economize on moral disagreement
by refusing to challenge other people’s deeply held moral commitments when it is not necessary for
them to do so.”
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3. Proportionality as a legitimate framework for Canadian rights
resolution cases
It is important to recognize that a utilitarian approach to resolving rights
claims was not inevitable or foreordained: other (e.g., deontological)
options could have been developed, and some element of choice was
therefore involved in the selection of the current utilitarian proportionality
approaches. As one might expect, therefore, these utilitarian proportionality
approaches are not universally accepted as legitimate.
Miller, for instance, is strongly critical of judicial proportionality
assessments, mainly because (he argues) they move unavoidable and
controversial moral evaluations out of view, or off-stage, in a way that
makes it difficult or impossible for the public to question and debate the
appropriateness of these evaluations.36 Justice Brennan of the Supreme
Court of the United States also voiced this concern, suggesting that
references to utilitarian balancing exercises are a mere cover for the
hidden personal policy preferences of individual judges.37 If these
critics are correct, then predicting how rights disputes will be decided
will be challenging for both ordinary citizens and members of the legal
profession: proportionality assessments would amount to just idiosyncratic
expressions of a particular judge’s personal or political preferences—and
would therefore be incapable of offering meaningful guidance to those
governed by the law.
Urbina also criticizes judicial balancing and proportionality tests
in the context of human rights adjudication, because these tests suggest
to judges and to the public that rights are commensurable—or capable
of being quantified and compared with one another according to some
common scale—when (he argues) this is not the case.38 Justice Scalia
similarly observed that “the scale analogy is not really appropriate, since
the interests on both sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging
whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”39
Webber echoes this concern about the incommensurability of rights, and
he goes further by suggesting that proportionality-styled, rights-limiting
frameworks undermine the normative value that rights ought to have

36. Miller, supra note 34 at 385.
37. See New Jersey v TLO, (1985) 469 US 325 at 369-370: “All of these ‘balancing tests’ amount to
brief nods by the Court in the direction of a neutral utilitarian calculus while the Court in fact engages
in an unanalyzed exercise of judicial will. Perhaps this doctrinally destructive nihilism is merely a
convenient umbrella under which a majority that cannot agree on a genuine rationale can conceal its
differences.”
38. Francisco J Urbina, “Incommensurability and Balancing” (2015) 35:3 Oxford J Leg Stud 575.
39. Bendix Autolite Corp v Midwesco Enterprises Inc, (1998) 486 US 888 at 897.
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and may result in generalized weakness of, and uncertainty about, rights
guarantees.40
Notwithstanding these criticisms, a significant number of influential
scholars tend to accept that utilitarian and proportionality-based approaches
to the resolution of rights claims may be the best ways to deal with
claims involving true conflicts of rights. Waldron, for instance, suggests
that it might be preferable, where possible, to engage in more nuanced
calculations about harms and benefits than simply calculations involving
raw numbers of affected individuals on both sides of the equation, but
he notes that this will often be impossible; proportionality, then, is the
best solution in many or most cases.41 Elsewhere, Waldron also discredits
arguments that rights are absolutely (or strongly) incommensurable, and
he suggests that rights are often only weakly incommensurable, in the
sense that they may not all have values derived from a common scale of
measurement, but they are all still capable of being ordered and prioritized
according to a set of rules or considerations that balance and weigh the
rights against one another.42
Aharon Barak, probably the most prominent jurist on the subject of
proportionality in constitutional law, also offers compelling defences
for the use of proportionality tests. He justifies the use of these tests
because they facilitate the resolution of rights claims by recognizing that
“[p]rinciples at the same normative level can be considered to be of
different social importance” in particular cases.43 This acknowledgement,
according to Barak, allows for flexible and principled decision-making on
the basis of the facts relevant to each specific rights claim.44 While Barak
is not blind to the criticisms that others may direct toward the concept of
proportionality, he ultimately concludes that “the suggested alternatives
are no better. In fact, their defects exceed those of proportionality.”45
It is apparent that one can use reason and logic to both attack and
defend utilitarian proportionality approaches toward resolving rights
claims. However, scholars tend to agree that proportionality is widely
40. Grégoire C N Webber, The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights (Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 2010) at 89-114; see especially ibid at 101: “Even assuming that engaging in allthings-considered balancing and proportionality analyses were possible in the technical sense, doing
so would do violence to the idea of a constitution and the guarantee of rights.”
41. Jeremy Waldron, “Rights in Conflict” (1989) 99:3 Ethics 503 at 518-519.
42. See generally Jeremy Waldron, “Fake Incommensurability: A Response to Professor Schauer”
(1994) 45:4 Hastings LJ 813.
43. Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 2012) at 350.
44. Ibid at 358.
45. Ibid at 481.
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accepted as the preferred approach to dealing with conflicts of rights and
rights limitations. David Beatty notes that proportionality tests are used,
to differing extents, within the constitutional and human rights regimes in
Canada, the United States, Germany, South Africa, Israel, Japan, Hungary,
Australia, and at the European Court of Human Rights,46 and he concludes
strongly from this and other considerations that there can be no question
about the legitimacy of using proportionality assessments.47 Langvatn
suggests that there “is now a growing literature that holds this test out
as the most suitable test of the public justifiability (or public reason) for
rights-infringing acts and measures.”48 Even critics of proportionality
accept that “the principle of proportionality is more or less unanimously
endorsed,”49 even if there remains much debate about how proportionality
ought to be applied to weigh and balance particular interests in particular
cases.50
As the above discussion attempts to establish, the general concept
of proportionality as a practical and utilitarian approach to resolving
rights claims is widely defended by jurists and adopted by constitutional
courts. Proportionality is not without its flaws, but it appears to be the
best basis (and I accept it as the best basis) for working out the competing
relationships between rights themselves, and between rights and other
socially valuable interests. Accepting that proportionality is the best,
or least worst, framework to use in cases involving these competing
relationships, however, is just the first step in determining how individual
cases should be decided. In the next Part of this article, analysis of several
contemporary Canadian freedom of religion cases will show how the
concept of proportionality is used in practice, and how its application
tends to disadvantage freedom of religion claims in these cases.
II. Crimes, weddings, degrees, and deaths: The sites of tension between
religious freedom and other Charter rights since 2010
While it may not have been accurate in my previous writing51 to
characterize freedom of religion as a right that is second among equals, it
was clearly established in this work that, at least between 1995 and 2010,
SCC cases involving freedom of religion tended to require significant
46. David Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (New York: Oxford UP, 2004) at 162-163.
47. Ibid at 170.
48. Silje A Langvatn, “Taking Public Reason to Court: Understanding References to Public Reason
in Discussions about Courts and Adjudication” in Silje A Langvatn, Mattias Kumm & Wojciech
Sadurski, eds, Public Reason and Courts (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2020) 1 at 15.
49. Webber, supra note 40 at 88.
50. Ibid.
51. Madden, supra note 1.
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compromise from the religious adherents whose cases were before the
Court.52 Has this phenomenon continued into the present? As discussed in
the following sections, given how provincial courts of appeal and the SCC
have resolved cases since 2010 involving conflicts between freedom of
religion and other Charter interests, it seems that religious freedom rights
are still regularly, and perhaps overwhelmingly, required to give way.
As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that this subordination
of religion appears to occur regardless of whether the rights in issue are
addressed under a traditional Oakes analysis,53 or under the administrative
law framework that was set forth in Doré54 for considering government
decisions that implicate Charter rights and values.55 The requirement
for religion to yield also seems to manifest in the case law regardless of
whether freedom of religion conflicts directly with another enumerated
Charter right,56 or whether it more indirectly encroaches upon a Charter
“value”57 (that is, with an idea that is expressed or implied within the
Charter, rather than with a cognizable Charter right).58 A more complete
52. Ibid at 86.
53. For instance, the SK Marriage Reference, supra note 6 at paras 67-100, was decided under a
traditional Oakes/proportionality analysis. Likewise, the ON Physician Case, supra note 6 at paras
58-60 and 96-187, was decided on the basis of a traditional Oakes/proportionality analysis, although
the Court of Appeal for Ontario seemed to question whether this was the appropriate framework (ibid
at para 60):
Accordingly, I would leave for another day the question of which standard of review and
framework ought to be applied in these circumstances. For the purposes of these reasons, I
simply apply the standard and framework chosen by the Divisional Court, which formed the
basis of the parties’ submissions on appeal. Nevertheless, like the Divisional Court, I would
reach the same result applying a reasonableness standard and the Doré/Loyola framework.
54. Supra note 5.
55. For instance, the MB Marriage Case, supra note 6 at para 30, and the TWU BC case, supra note
6 at paras 57-105, both proceeded on the basis of a Doré analysis.
56. This type of right-versus-right conflict took place in the Niqab Case, supra note 6, wherein a
witness’ right to freely exercise her religion under paragraph 2(a) of the Charter by wearing a niqab
while testifying in a criminal trial clashed with the accused’s right to make a full answer and defence
(under section 7 of the Charter) by having the witness’ face exposed for the purposes of obtaining
cross-examination cues from the witness, and of facilitating credibility assessments of the witness.
57. For instance, in TWU BC, supra note 6, the reasons of Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner,
and Gascon JJ were replete with references to the Charter values, including values of equality and
human rights (ibid at paras 41 and 46), that factored into the decision. In separate reasons, McLachlin
CJ (concurring), Rowe J (concurring in the result), and Coté and Brown JJ (dissenting) were all critical
in different ways of the majority’s reliance on Charter values, as opposed to Charter rights, to dispose
of the appeal.
58. Charter values have been described as “those values that underpin each right and give
it meaning,” and it has been suggested that these values “help determine the extent of any given
infringement in the particular administrative context and, correlatively, when limitations on that right
are proportionate in light of the applicable statutory objectives” (Loyola, supra note 5 at para 36).
It is beyond the scope of this article to fully canvass the manner in which Charter values have been
relied upon by Canadian courts generally, but it is worth noting that many courts and academics have
been critical of the use of Charter values writ large. See e.g. Gehl v Canada (Attorney General), 2017
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account of how freedom of religion is treated in leading appellate and SCC
cases since 2010 is contained in the sections immediately below.
1. Provincial Court of Appeal cases
At the appellate court level, the three most significant cases (in terms of
complexity, depth of analysis, and notoriety) since 2010 involving freedom
of religion claims that were in tension with other Charter rights or values
are, arguably, the SK Marriage Reference, the MB Marriage Case, and the
ON Physician Case.
The SK Marriage Reference originated from a refusal (based on religious
grounds) by some Saskatchewan marriage commissioners to solemnize
same-sex marriages. The Saskatchewan government had subsequently
requested an advisory opinion from the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan
(SKCA) concerning the constitutionality of two contemplated amendments
to the provincial Marriage Act.59 Both amendments would have permitted
marriage commissioners to refuse to solemnize same-sex marriages out of
respect for the religious beliefs of these commissioners.60
The SKCA unanimously ruled that the proposed amendments would
infringe Charter subsection 15(1) equality rights of same-sex couples in
ways that could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter.61 The Court
quickly found that the contemplated amendments would infringe upon the
equality rights of same-sex couples62 and proceeded to complete a lengthy
Oakes analysis.63 This analysis recognized that government compulsion of
a marriage commissioner to solemnize same-sex marriages would result in
an infringement upon the commissioner’s freedom of religion rights under
paragraph 2(a) of the Charter.64 The Court then gave a full measure (i.e., 13
paragraphs) of consideration to the freedom of religion interests that were
at stake in the case65 and noted transparently how conflicting freedom of
religion and equality rights needed to be reconciled.66 This recognition of
the importance of freedom of religion as a right that cannot automatically
be trumped by equality rights reinforces the notion that the different rights
have—at least in the abstract—the same value and importance. This point

ONCA 319, per Lauwers and Miller JJA (concurring), at paras 76-83 (for a forceful caution against
reliance on Charter values in constitutional adjudication); see also Macklin, supra note 17.
59. SK Marriage Reference, supra note 6 at paras 1-2.
60. Ibid at para 2.
61. Ibid at paras 101 and 162.
62. Ibid at paras 39 and 41-45.
63. Ibid at paras 53-100.
64. Ibid at paras 53-65.
65. Ibid at paras 54-66.
66. Ibid at para 66.
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was made even more explicit by the SKCA’s description of how rights
reconciliation must unfold: “This assessment must, of course, proceed on
the basis that the Charter does not create a hierarchy of rights and that
neither s. 2(a) interests nor those interests arising under s. 15(1) are, by
definition, more worthy of being safeguarded than the other.”67
However, the Court found that the contemplated amendments did not
minimally impair the equality rights of same-sex couples.68 Furthermore,
in the final stage of its proportionality analysis, the Court found that the
harms of the law would outweigh its benefits:69 gay and lesbian couples
“could be shunned,”70 the harms could “ripple through friends and families
of gay and lesbian persons and the public as a whole,”71 and the rule of law
could be weakened by commissioners who attempt to shape their office’s
role “to make it conform with their personal religious or other beliefs.”72
The SK Marriage Reference as a whole, then, does two important
things: first, it demonstrates one Canadian court’s commitment to treating
all Charter rights as having the same conceptual value; and, second, it
illustrates how, at a more concrete and factual level, the benefits gained
by individual exercises of religious rights can be outweighed by the harms
that such exercises inflict upon the equality rights of others.
The SK Marriage Reference was followed in 2018 by a substantially
similar case—the MB Marriage Case.73 In that case, the government of
Manitoba withdrew a religious marriage commissioner’s registration to
solemnize marriages because the commissioner refused to solemnize
same-sex marriages.74 At the Court of Appeal for Manitoba (MBCA),
the Court found that the government’s decision amounted to more than
trivial or insubstantial interference with the commissioner’s freedom
of religion,75 but it nonetheless held that the decision was reasonable.76
The MBCA found that the commissioner’s right to religious freedom
was in conflict with the equality rights of same-sex couples and nonChristian couples (whose marriages the commissioner also refused to
solemnize).77 No actual same-sex or non-Christian couples were identified
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Ibid.
Ibid at paras 85-88.
Ibid at paras 90-99.
Ibid at para 94.
Ibid at para 96.
Ibid at para 97.
MB Marriage Case, supra note 6.
Ibid at para 2.
Ibid at para 63.
Ibid at para 91.
Ibid at paras 75-76.
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as having been harmed by the commissioner’s refusal to solemnize certain
marriages, but the MBCA nonetheless characterized the conflict between
Charter religious and equality rights in this case as being real, and not
simply hypothetical.78 In considering how to balance these competing
rights in a reasonable way, the MBCA confirmed that the harm to equality
rights would be “very significant and genuinely offensive,”79 and therefore
upheld the application judge’s decision.
In the process of articulating this decision, the MBCA rejected the
commissioner’s argument that the revocation of his registration created
a hierarchy of rights wherein equality would have precedence over
religion.80 The Court found that the application judge’s decision “clearly
indicates that a balancing of rights occurred, as opposed to the creation
of a hierarchy. […] The Decision is reasonable. It reflects a considered
balancing of the Charter protections in issue, accommodating both
interests in a proportionate manner and in accord with the fundamental
values protected by the Charter.”81
In this case, as in the SK Marriage Reference, a Canadian appellate
court again confirmed the equal importance that all Charter rights have as
a general matter, but again found that the harm to equality rights of certain
individuals that would flow from a commissioner’s free exercise of his
religious rights was disproportionate. In other words, these two marriage
commissioner cases illustrate how religious and equality rights start from
the same positions of value in cases of rights conflicts, but also how realworld fact scenarios can give substance to cost-benefit calculations in
ways that drive courts to find in favour of equality interests at the expense
of religious rights.
The final Canadian appellate case since 2010 that merits consideration
here is the ON Physician Case.82 In that case, several religious physicians
sought to have the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario’s
(“the College”) policy on effective referrals declared unconstitutional as
an infringement of their freedom of religion.83 The policy required any
physician who objected on religious grounds to performing abortions,
prescribing contraceptives, providing medical assistance in dying, and
offering certain other forms of care that may be religiously contentious, to
provide patients with effective referrals to other health care providers who
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Ibid at para 75.
Ibid at para 77, citing SK Marriage Reference, supra note 6 at para 41.
Ibid at paras 80-92.
Ibid at para 91.
Supra note 6.
Ibid at para 2.
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could deliver the requested medical care.84 The religious physicians were
unsuccessful in their applications for declarations of unconstitutionality
at the Divisional Court level.85 They therefore appealed to the Court of
Appeal for Ontario (ONCA).
The ONCA saw this case as one involving a conflict between the
Charter section 7 rights of patients (to access health care) and Charter
religious freedom rights of physicians,86 and engaged in an Oakes
analysis to dispose of the appeal.87 In assessing whether the College’s
policy minimally impaired the Charter rights of objecting physicians,
the ONCA focused at length on the “rejection, shame and stigma” that
patients would feel when denied medical services on time-sensitive
issues,88 noting that—on the evidence—these were “not theoretical”
harms.89 The Court concluded that the College’s policy was minimally
impairing of objecting physicians’ rights.90 In the final step of its Oakes
analysis, the ONCA discussed the burden that the effective referral policy
created for objecting physicians but ultimately concluded that “patients
should not bear the burden of managing the consequences of physicians’
religious objections.”91 The ONCA found that the harms to physicians
caused by the policy were outweighed by the harms to patients that the
policy prevented.92
The ON Physician Case was perhaps less explicit than the two
marriage commissioner cases in terms of its affirmation of the equal
status of all Charter rights as a starting point for its analysis. However,
the ONCA gave significant consideration to the matter of the objecting
physicians’ freedom of religion in a way that suggested the importance
of the right. The ONCA was also clearly concerned about the section 7
Charter interests of patients that were in tension with the religious rights
of the objecting physicians, and it seemed to be similarly concerned about
patients’ equality rights (even if these were not explicitly mentioned).93
While all of these rights may have held the same value to the Court as a
general matter, the particular facts and evidence in this case led the Court
84. Ibid at paras 14-27.
85. Ibid at para 5.
86. Ibid at para 166.
87. Ibid at paras 96-187.
88. Ibid at para 132.
89. Ibid at para 133; see also ibid at para 161.
90. Ibid at paras 160-161.
91. Ibid at para 185.
92. Ibid at para 187.
93. See, for instance, ibid at para 123, where the ONCA appears concerned about the same types of
historical marginalization and oppression (of pregnant women and of seriously disabled patients) that
often forms the subject matter of Charter subsection 15(1) litigation.
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to conclude that the religious rights of objecting physicians needed to be
compromised in order to avoid greater harms to the rights and interests of
vulnerable patient groups.
2. SCC cases
At the SCC level, two cases since 2010 stand out for their consideration of
freedom of religion rights that were in conflict with other Charter rights:
the Niqab Case (2012) and TWU BC (2018).
The Niqab Case centred on the question of whether a Muslim
sexual assault complainant should be permitted to wear her niqab on the
witness stand in accordance with her right to freely exercise her religion,
notwithstanding the impact that wearing the niqab might have on the
accused men’s Charter rights to make a full answer and defence.94 The
SCC majority in this case (there were separate concurring and dissenting
opinions that will not be discussed here for the sake of brevity) decided
to remit the case to the court of first instance for reconsideration,95 but in
the process, it essentially described how the case should be decided upon
reconsideration.
Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for the majority, quickly
acknowledged that religious and fair trial Charter rights seemed to conflict
in this case and affirmed that a court must first attempt to “resolve the
claims in a way that will preserve both rights.”96 However, the majority
then telegraphed its suspicion that this type of resolution may be
impossible in the Niqab Case.97 The Chief Justice then considered how a
proportionality analysis might unfold in this case upon reconsideration, as
she identified—but purported not to weigh—the potential harms on both
sides of the conflicting rights equation.98 She first noted that “it is difficult
to measure the value of adherence to religious conviction, or the injury
caused by being required to depart from it,”99 and she seemed to suggest
94. Niqab Case, supra note 6 at paras 5-9. The right of an accused to make a full answer and defence
to criminal charges is protected under s 7 of the Charter: see R v Mills, [1999] 3 SCR 668 at para 69.
95. Niqab Case, supra note 6 at para 13.
96. Ibid at para 32.
97. Ibid at para 33:
On the facts of this case, it may be that no accommodation is possible; excluding men from
the courtroom would have implications for the open court principle, the right of the accused to
be present at his trial, and potentially his right to counsel of his choice. Testifying without the
niqab via closed-circuit television or behind a one-way screen may not satisfy N.S.’s religious
obligations. However, when this case is reheard, the preliminary inquiry judge must consider the
possibility of accommodation based on the evidence presented by the parties.
98. Ibid at paras 34-45.
99. Ibid at para 36. This statement echoes an earlier statement by McLachlin CJ in Hutterian
Brethren, supra note 21 at para 89:
There is no magic barometer to measure the seriousness of a particular limit on a religious
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that factors such as the number, identity, and gender of the individuals
present in the room during the witness’ testimony would all need to be
considered in quantifying the harm to NS’s religious rights.100 The Chief
Justice also noted the broader harm that may flow from any requirement
for NS to remove her niqab while testifying: similarly situated victims
and witnesses in the future may be deterred from reporting crimes, which
would represent a cost to those individuals and to the public as a whole.101
Chief Justice McLachlin then stressed the importance of effective
cross-examination and credibility assessments as elements of the right to
a fair trial, which she described as “a fundamental pillar without which
the edifice of the rule of law would crumble.”102 The deployment of this
dramatic metaphor may represent a turning point in the decision, wherein
it begins to seem obvious how the majority thinks that the rights-balancing
ought to be performed by the court of first instance. The majority concludes
its proportionality guidance in very strong, and probably conclusive,
language: “it may be ventured that where the liberty of the accused is at
stake, the witness’s evidence is central to the case and her credibility vital,
the possibility of a wrongful conviction must weigh heavily in the balance,
favouring removal of the niqab.”103
The SCC majority’s reasons in the Niqab Case represent a statement
from Canada’s apex court that freedom of religion cannot automatically
be trumped by another right. The majority stresses that efforts must be
made to reconcile competing rights claims and explains over some 11
paragraphs why any approach that creates a firm rule giving one right
precedence over another in a case like this must be rejected.104 In this
sense, like the two marriage commissioner cases, the Niqab Case goes to
practice. Religion is a matter of faith, intermingled with culture. It is individual, yet profoundly
communitarian. Some aspects of a religion, like prayers and the basic sacraments, may be so
sacred that any significant limit verges on forced apostasy. Other practices may be optional or a
matter of personal choice. Between these two extremes lies a vast array of beliefs and practices,
more important to some adherents than to others.
100. Niqab Case, supra note 6 at para 36.
101. Ibid at para 37.
102. Ibid at para 38.
103. Ibid at para 44. Notwithstanding the majority’s apparent acceptance of the importance of
seeing a witness’ face as part of the need to ensure a fair trial (if not for the purpose of credibility
assessments, at least for the purpose of permitting trial counsel to act on subtle visual cues as part of
cross-examination), it is worth noting that the empirical validity of arguments linking trial fairness
with one’s ability to see a witness’ demeanour has been called into question by a number of scholars.
See e.g. Natasha Bakht, “In Your Face: Piercing the Veil of Ignorance about Niqab-Wearing Women”
(2015) 24:3 Soc & Leg Stud 419; see also Karl Laird, “Confronting Religion: Veiled Witnesses, the
Right to a Fair Trial and the Supreme Court of Canada’s Judgment in R v N.S.” (2014) 77:1 Mod L
Rev 123.
104. Niqab Case, supra note 6 at paras 46-56.
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great lengths to dispel any notion that a hierarchy of rights exists within
the Charter. However, it seems evident from the majority’s reasons that
they viewed the harms to the two accused whose fair trial rights could be
compromised, and to all members of society who share a common interest
in the conduct of fair criminal trials, as being greater than the harms to
a religious witness who must remove her niqab. Once again, at the level
of specific facts within specific cases, a Canadian court saw the weight
of religious interests as relatively light in comparison with the weight of
other Charter interests.
The last religious freedom case since 2010 meriting discussion
here is the TWU BC case.105 That case arose when the Law Society of
British Columbia (LSBC) decided not to approve a proposed law school
at an evangelical Christian institution, Trinity Western University, where
there would have been a mandatory Covenant applicable to all students
that prohibited any sexual relations outside of the sanctity of marriage
“between a man and a woman.”106 The Charter protection at play in the
case was the religious freedom of Trinity Western University, and of
prospective students who may have attended the proposed law school
(collectively, “the Claimants”),107 which was in tension with the LSBC’s
statutory mandate of “upholding and maintaining the public interest in
the administration of justice.”108 A majority of the SCC (there were four
sets of reasons between the nine judges who decided the appeal, but
again, only the majority opinion is discussed here for the sake of brevity)
accepted that “promoting equality by ensuring equal access to the legal
profession, supporting diversity within the bar, and preventing harm to
LGBTQ law students were valid means by which the LSBC could pursue
its overarching statutory duty.”109
The majority did not characterize this case as one that involved
conflicting Charter rights, even though it may have been possible to
argue that the subsection 15(1) equality rights of LGBTQ individuals
were implicated in the LSBC’s decision, as members of a group whose
105. This case has been the subject of extensive commentary in academic circles. See e.g. Alice
Woolley & Amy Salyzyn, “Protecting the Public Interest: Law Society Decision-Making after Trinity
Western University” (2019) 97:1 Can Bar Rev 70; Barry W Bussey, “Law Matters but Politics Matter
More: The Supreme Court of Canada and Trinity Western University” (2018) 7:3 Oxford JL &
Religion 559. For a particularly personal and candid analysis of the decision, see Diana Ginn & Kevin
Kindred, “Pluralism, Autonomy and Resistance: A Canadian Perspective on Resolving Conflicts
between Freedom of Religion and LGBTQ Rights” (2017) 12:1 Religion & Human Rights 1.
106. TWU BC, supra note 6 at para 6.
107. Ibid at para 2.
108. Ibid at para 40.
109. Ibid.
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conduct (and, in many ways, identity) was targeted by the University’s
Covenant in a discriminatory manner. Nonetheless, it seems clear from
the LSBC’s efforts to make a decision that promoted equality, supported
diversity, and prevented harm to LGBTQ law students, and from the SCC
majority’s acceptance of this basis for the LSBC’s decision, that the case
was fundamentally about resolving a conflict between religious freedom
and equality objectives110—both of which find expression in the Charter.
The majority gave due consideration to the religious freedom rights
that were affected by the LSBC’s decision and recognized the importance
of both the individual and communitarian aspects involved in practicing
one’s religion.111 The majority then proceeded to engage in a harm-benefit
weighing assessment in order to determine whether the LSBC’s decision
proportionately balanced the statutory objective with the Claimants’
Charter interests, as required by the Doré framework.
In considering the harms to the Claimants’ rights, the majority noted
that “the limitation in this case is of minor significance” because it only
prevented students from “studying law in their optimal religious learning
environment where everyone has to abide by the Covenant.”112 Essentially,
the majority concluded that an enforced Covenant was, for the Claimants,
a nice-to-have rather than a need-to-have condition for their studies.113
In contrast, the majority found that the Covenant would cause numerous
harms to members of the LGBTQ community and to the broader public—
harms that the majority characterized as “concrete, not abstract, harms to
LGBTQ people and to the public in general.”114 Both the individual and
collective elements of these harms were discussed at length.115 When all of
these harms were considered in the aggregate, the SCC majority seemed
to be most troubled by their sense that the “Covenant is a commitment
to enforcing a religiously based code of conduct, not just in respect of
one’s own behaviour, but also in respect of other members of the TWU
community.”116 Because the Covenant was really, for the majority, all
about projecting one’s religious beliefs onto others, the majority found
that the LSBC’s decision did not represent “a serious limitation on the
religious rights of members of the TWU community.”117 In contrast, being

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Ginn & Kindred, supra note 105 at 4.
TWU BC, supra note 6 at para 64.
Ibid at para 87 (emphasis in original).
Ibid at paras 88 and 90.
Ibid at para 103 (emphasis in original).
Ibid at paras 93, 95, and 98.
Ibid at para 99.
Ibid at para 102.
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“required by someone else’s religious beliefs to behave contrary to one’s
sexual identity is degrading and disrespectful.”118 The majority found that
the LSBC’s decision to refuse to approve the University’s law school
represented a proportionate balance.119
The TWU BC case is interesting (and similar in certain ways to the
MB Marriage Case and the ON Physician Case) in that it involves tension
between the clear religious Charter rights of identifiable claimants (the
University and a representative potential student) on the one hand, and
the less clear Charter-protected equality values of a group that was not
directly a party to the litigation (the LGBTQ community) on the other
hand. In spite of this reality, the SCC majority, like the courts in all of the
previous cases discussed above, ultimately concluded that the benefits of
protecting religious rights to their fullest was outweighed on the specific
facts of the case by the harms that would result to others from such a
decision—in this case to members of the LGBTQ community and the
public. Although the SCC majority did not reassert the Court’s position
that there is no hierarchy of rights under the Charter in TWU BC, this
omission can perhaps best be explained by recalling that the majority did
not frame the case as one involving a direct conflict of rights in the first
place.
3. Religious rights in Canada—generally equal, but specifically losing
As the above overview of five key religious freedom cases in Canada
suggests, Canadian courts continue to make strong efforts to reinforce the
conceptually equal status of all Charter rights and to engage with religious
freedom issues in detailed ways. It seems from these cases that, where
religious Charter rights are in tension or conflict with other Charter rights
or values, Canadian courts begin from the conceptual position that no right
should automatically prevail over another right. However, as the cases
discussed in this Part show, once courts are forced to descend from the
abstract of rights guarantees into the particular facts of the cases, it appears
as if the factors that weigh against protecting religious rights to their full
extent tend to carry more weight than the factors weighing in favour of
protecting religious rights.120 In Part III, below, I offer an account as to why
this tendency in the jurisprudence is justifiable as a matter of persuasive
118. Ibid at para 101.
119. Ibid at para 104.
120. See Richard Moon, Freedom of Conscience and Religion (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014) at 137
(wherein the author notes that Canadian courts affirm the importance of religious identity when
finding infringements on freedom of religion, but tend to weigh religious considerations lightly when
conducting proportionality analyses).

22 The Dalhousie Law Journal

theory. For the time being, however, I have tried to illustrate how freedom
of religion is viewed conceptually by Canadian courts as a right worthy
of equal protection alongside other rights, but how the right is nonetheless
one that courts are willing to see compromised in specific cases in order
to achieve proportionate balances between competing rights and interests
in those cases.
Before going further, I must acknowledge that my analysis only
considers a small number of notorious Canadian cases since 2010, and
only ones decided at the level of appeal/apex courts. Thus, one might
be concerned about drawing widespread general conclusions from my
analysis. This is a fair concern. For the purposes of the discussion that
follows in this article, however, it is not important to quantify exactly
how widespread the phenomenon (of stressing the importance of religious
freedom before requiring that it yield to other rights and interests) might
be. Rather, it is only important to acknowledge that the phenomenon exists
in some or many cases, and that it is therefore worthwhile to expose and
contemplate the phenomenon.
There is also, perhaps, a more epistemic concern with my analysis:
we can probably never know what value Canadian judges internally place
on religious freedom rights. A more cynical critic might suggest (as I
implicitly suggested in previous work)121 that Canadian courts simply pay
lip service to the notion of a non-hierarchical set of rights that includes
freedom of religion, before they consciously subordinate religious rights
to any other rights that are at stake in a case. Again, for the purposes of
the discussion that follows (attempting to justify the outcomes in these
cases in broadly accepted terms that are grounded in legal and liberal
political theory), no level of absolute certainty as to how Canadian judges
personally value freedom of religion alongside other rights is needed. I am
far more concerned here with what judges do than with what they think.
III. Justifying religious losses: Public reason, third-party and dignitary
harms, and emancipation rights
Having shown in Part I how proportionality represents an appropriate
general framework for assessing rights claims, and having demonstrated in
Part II how freedom of religion tends to be the right that must yield when
Canadian proportionality assessments are completed in contemporary
cases of conflicting Charter rights or values, I now consider how it
may be justifiable or legitimate for proportionality assessments to lead
so commonly to such results in spite of the conceptually equal status of
121. See generally Madden, supra note 1.
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freedom of religion alongside other Charter rights. If freedom of religion
truly is equal in value to other rights, then how can we accept so many
losses on the religious side of the conflicts in contemporary cases?
1. Public reason and the exclusion of religious considerations
One justification for the phenomenon in Canadian case law involves
the concept of public reason. As Solum notes, “it was John Rawls who
brought this idea into play in contemporary political philosophy,”122
mainly in Political Liberalism,123 wherein Rawls dedicates an entire
chapter to the subject of public reason.124 For Rawls, one of the keys
to success in promoting justice and stability in a pluralistic society was
through legitimacy, which required an exclusive reliance by certain actors
in certain contexts on a form of discourse that he referred to as public
reason.125
Public reason, according to Rawls, should be applied to “questions
concerning constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.”126 It
applies to all government actors (including legislators, administrators,
and judges) in their official capacities, and it applies to citizens more
generally when advocating politically in public forums.127 A justification
that is properly grounded in public reason must consist only of appeals
“to presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in
common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science when these
are not controversial.”128 Arguments by way of public reason are, to Rawls,
necessary as a matter of legitimacy because “political power is proper and
hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution
the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse
in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and
rational.”129 In other words, “in discussing constitutional essentials and
matters of basic justice we are not to appeal to comprehensive religious
and philosophical doctrines—to what we as individuals or members of
associations see as the whole truth,”130 because such appeals cannot be
122. Lawrence B Solum, “Public Legal Reason” (2006) 92:7 Va L Rev 1449 at 1467.
123. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded ed (New York: Columbia UP, 1993).
124. Ibid at Lecture VI, “The Idea of Public Reason.”
125. Ibid at 217: “since the exercise of political power itself must be legitimate, the ideal of citizenship
imposes a moral, not a legal, duty—the duty of civility—to be able to explain to one another on those
fundamental questions how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by
the political values of public reason.”
126. Ibid at 252.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid at 224.
129. Ibid at 217.
130. Ibid at 224-225.
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endorsed as rational by other citizens who share contradictory or divergent
religious or moral views.
Many scholars since Rawls have attempted to expand, limit, or
otherwise adapt Rawls’ conception of public reason in different ways,131
but these scholars are all generally preoccupied with a common concern
about identifying the types of arguments that are legitimate or acceptable
as justifications for exercises of public power.132 Many of these scholars
seem to agree that religiously and morally based justifications for exercises
of public power will be problematic because they will be incapable of
being accepted by all members of the public, who may not all share the
same religious or moral comprehensive doctrines.133
Although there is substantial disagreement about whether it is fair to
require religious citizens to refrain from justifying their political positions
in terms of religious arguments as a blanket rule,134 a compelling rationale
for this dimension of public reason theory can be advanced within the
narrower context of actions taken by government actors in their official
capacities. Solum, for instance, proposes a concept of public legal reason,
wherein “legal officials should offer only public reasons for their official
actions in official contexts.”135 Solum further suggests that stability and
legitimacy problems will inevitably arise if this requirement of public
legal reason is not respected:
[I]t is one thing to be asked to accept an authoritative decision based on contestable
evidence that dioxin causes cancer. It is quite another to be asked to accept that God’s plan
requires that women be subservient—or, for that matter, for a believer to be asked to accept
a decision based on the premise that God does not exist. […] Given the fact of pluralism,
many or most citizens will regard any legal decision that rests on deep and controversial
premises of religious or moral doctrines as illegitimate in the sense that it lacks reasonable
justification.136
131. See e.g. Solum, supra note 122, especially at 1472-1482 (introducing a subset of public reason
that he refers to as “public legal reason”); see also Langvatn, supra note 48 at 13-35 (summarizing six
different major variants of public reason theory).
132. Melissa Yates, “Rawls and Habermas on Religion in the Public Sphere” (2016) 33:7 Philosophy
& Soc Criticism 880 at 881: “As a consequence of the fact of pluralism, most theorists maintain that
coercive law should not be justified on grounds that presuppose one particular world-view.”
133. See e.g. Rawls, supra note 123 at 224-225; see also Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public
Sphere” (2006) 14:1 European J Philosophy 1 at 9; and see Andrew F March, “Rethinking Religious
Reasons in Public Justification” (2013) 107:3 American Political Science Rev 523 at 524.
134. See e.g. Yates, supra note 132 at 881-888, describing both the split-identity objection to this
conception of public reason (i.e., the objection that religious citizens must present a public persona
that is different from their private and more religious persona) and the asymmetry objection (i.e., the
objection that religious citizens face more difficulty in justifying their political positions than nonreligious citizens, because the latter are free to drawn upon their secular comprehensive doctrines,
while the former are prohibited from drawing upon their religious comprehensive doctrines).
135. Solum, supra note 122 at 1473.
136. Ibid at 1477; see also Benjamin L Berger, “Understanding Law and Religion as Culture: Making
Room for Meaning in the Public Sphere” (2006) 15:1 Const Forum Const 15 (wherein the author
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This view aligns closely with Habermas’ view that, in the formal public
political sphere (as opposed to the informal public political sphere), only
secular justifications for exercises of power ought to be offered.137 In a
Canadian context (specifically relating to the ON Physician Case), it also
accords with Moon’s argument that a person’s “beliefs concerning civic
issues, such as the rights and interests of others and the just arrangement
of social relations, even if grounded in a religious system, must be subject
to the give-and-take of ordinary politics.”138
It would probably be unnecessary, however, even within this narrower
sphere of actions taken by government actors acting in their official
capacities, to exclude all arguments that are connected with religion from
political discourse. As March astutely points out, such arguments come in
wide varieties of form and substance, and they tend to differ in the extents to
which they might adversely affect the legitimacy of public decisions: these
arguments often “involve greater or lesser degrees of appeals to revelatory
or clerical authority”139 and will only sometimes “require unintelligible
or unreasonable self-sacrifice of fellow citizens.”140 March argues on this
basis, convincingly (I think), that we can “in good faith object to certain
modes of using religious arguments in certain areas of political decision
making (e.g., on sexuality and marriage) while not objecting to others
(e.g., on social justice).”141
A conclusion that at least some religiously based political arguments
(when advanced or accepted by public officials acting within their official
capacities) can justifiably be excluded as a matter of public legal reason
makes sense from a legitimacy perspective. If the foundation of legitimacy
truly requires, as Rawls suggests that it does, a reliance only on “principles
and ideals acceptable to [all citizens] as reasonable and rational,”142 then
the invocation of many religious arguments will be problematic because
religion is, in many ways, inherently irrational. On this point, I agree with
Leiter, who suggests that one of the distinctive features of religion is its
suggests that—when law conflicts with religion in a way that cannot otherwise be resolved—law
ought to prevail because law is ultimately necessary in order for individuals to live together in society,
in contrast with religion).
137. Habermas, supra note 133. For a similar argument, see Bruce MacDougall & Donn Short,
“Religion-Based Claims for Impinging on Queer Citizenship” (2010) 33 Dal LJ 133, wherein the
authors argue that religious rights should not be protected when doing so would encroach upon the
(equality) rights of others within the public sphere.
138. Richard Moon, “The Conscientious Objection of Medical Practitioners to the CPSO’s ‘Effective
Referral’ Requirement” (2020) 29:1 Const Forum Const 29 at 31.
139. March, supra note 133 at 525.
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid.
142. Rawls, supra note 123 at 217 (emphasis added).
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insulation from evidence: “the distinctively religious state of mind is that
of faith—that is, believing something notwithstanding the evidence and
reasons that fail to support it or even contradict it.”143 Leiter expands upon
this characterization of religion by noting that religious beliefs “do not
answer ultimately (or at the limit) to evidence and reasons, as these are
understood in other domains concerned with knowledge of the world.
Religious beliefs, in virtue of being based on ‘faith,’ are insulated from
ordinary standards of evidence and rational justification, the ones we
employ in both common sense and in science.”144
If this characterization of core religious beliefs is valid—and I think
that many religious adherents would accept it as such—then one can see
how religious arguments that fit within the characterization run afoul of
public legal reason’s requirement of rationality. Where such arguments
are offered to justify government decisions, and where some or many
members of the population cannot agree that the arguments are grounded
in rationality, then the decisions will be perceived as illegitimate.145 Such
illegitimacy “undermines the basis for reconciliation”;146 it prevents
citizens who disagree on fundamental questions of religion and morality
from finding ways of living harmoniously together in a just and stable
society.147
An awareness of this broad conception of public legal reason can
be seen in some of the cases discussed above in Part II, in two different
ways. First, in at least one case—the SK Marriage Reference—we can see
obvious concern on the part of the Court about a potential transgression of
the ideal of public legal reason:
Persons who voluntarily choose to assume an office, like that of marriage
commissioner, cannot expect to directly shape the office’s intersection
with the public so as to make it conform with their personal religious or
other beliefs. […] Marriage commissioners do not act as private citizens
when they discharge their official duties. Rather, they serve as agents
of the Province and act on its behalf and its behalf only. Accordingly,
a system that would make marriage services available according to the
personal religious beliefs of commissioners is highly problematic.148

143. Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2013) at 39 (emphasis in
original).
144. Ibid at 34.
145. Solum, supra note 122 at 1477.
146. Ibid at 1478.
147. Rawls, supra note 123 at 4.
148. SK Marriage Reference, supra note 6 at paras 97-98.
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As this excerpt illustrates, the SKCA seemed unwilling to enforce religious
rights over equality rights if doing so would permit public officials to
imbue their public decision-making (e.g., about whose marriages they
would solemnize) with their own personal religious convictions. Although
the SKCA did not explicitly refer to the concept of public reason, the
Court’s expressed concern (that public officials should not make decisions
on the basis of their private personal religious beliefs) is one that is central
to conceptions of public legal reason.
The second way in which public reason theory makes itself felt within
the cases discussed in Part II is less obvious because it relates more to
what is not said within the respective decisions than to what is said.
Specifically, I refer here to the tendency within proportionality analyses
(like the final component of the Oakes test) for courts to focus more on the
costs that a religious rights claimant would hypothetically need to incur in
order to avoid a rights conflict, rather than on the costs that the religious
rights claimant would actually incur if their right were not fully protected
by the courts.149 The former cost, which courts seem willing to grapple
with, is typically a monetary, time, or convenience cost—a cost that can
be understood and explained by reference to public reason. The latter cost
is a far more abstract and spiritual cost—the cost of not living fully in
accordance with deeply held religious beliefs. Courts seem unwilling in
the cases discussed above to do more than briefly identify that there may
be some spiritual costs (which are not easily amenable to discussion as a
matter of public reason),150 before moving back to a discussion of more
tangible (but arguably less relevant, from the claimant’s perspective) costs
that can be fully canvassed as a matter of public reason.151 This reliance
by courts on only arguments or costs that are grounded in public reason
149. See MB Marriage Case, supra note 6 at para 81 (where the MBCA is focused more on the
relatively low cost associated with the commissioner’s alternatives, like registering as a religious
officiant or obtaining temporary appointments for the purposes of individual marriage ceremonies,
rather than on the subjectively high degree of harm that the commissioner would experience if
required to solemnize marriages contrary to his religious beliefs); see also ON Physician Case, supra
note 6 at paras 173–186 (where the ONCA extensively considers the practical costs of hiring new
staff or changing one’s medical specialty to avoid a rights conflict but does not engage deeply with
the subjective spiritual costs that physicians will face if they must be complicit in practices that their
religions forbid).
150. See e.g. Blair Major, “Religion and Law in R v NS: Finding Space to Re-Think the Balancing
Analysis” (2015) 32:1 Windsor YB Access Just 25 at 30.
151. See, for instance, ON Physician Case, supra note 6 at para 165 (where the ONCA briefly
described the spiritual harm that objecting physicians would face as “the burden and anxiety associated
with a choice between their deeply-held religious beliefs and complicity in acts which they regard as
sinful”), and at paras 173–186 (where the ONCA discusses in much more detail the more tangible
costs of practical options available to objecting physicians, like changing their practice structure or
specialization, in order to avoid a rights conflict).
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causes a metaphorical lightening of the proportionality scales on the side
of freedom of religion: since the subjective spiritual costs that will be
incurred by the claimant cannot be explained or quantified in terms of
public reason, these costs seem to be acknowledged but then discounted
altogether from the proportionality calculus.152
While individual claimants may feel that the different courts’
adherence to principles of public legal reason work unfortunately to their
disadvantage, the practice is probably defensible in pursuit of broader
legitimacy goals. Placing substantial or dispositive weight on a spiritual
harm that a claimant will unquestionably experience, but that many/most
other members of society cannot understand because they do not share the
same religious belief system, will tend to cause legitimacy problems—
problems that Solum notes have highly undesirable consequences:
A regime of illegitimate authority can be oppressive, ineffectual, or
both. It can be oppressive because the reliable imposition of sanctions
without voluntary cooperation requires legal institutions that provide
pervasive monitoring and frequent punishment, and it can be ineffectual
because rates of coerced compliance are likely to be lower than rates
of voluntary cooperation with legitimate authority. Moreover, the evil
of illegitimacy is not limited to the realm of the practical. Legitimacy
reconciles citizens to the binding force of law; illegitimacy undermines
the basis for reconciliation and hence the moral worth of citizenship.153

In other words, if courts render decisions in rights-conflict cases on the
basis of non-public legal reasons, then the result could be a weakening of
respect for and compliance with the law across society. Exclusive resort to
forms of public legal reason by the courts is therefore a desirable reality,
even if it tends to contribute to a pattern of religious freedom losing in
contemporary cases involving rights-conflicts.

152. See Major, supra note 150 at 30-31 (discussing the Niqab Case):
Physical consequence that is empirically demonstrable (albeit it potential rather than actual)
weighs much more strongly for the court than spiritual consequence. This framework for giving
order to rights through the balancing analysis presumes a fundamental division between physical
and non-physical consequences. The fact that a risk of physical harm outweighs a sure spiritual
harm is itself a profound statement of philosophical commitment that reflects a hierarchy of
values.
153. Solum, supra note 122 at 1477-1478.
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2. Third-party and dignitary harms—tilting the scales away from
religion
The tendency for freedom of religion to lose in cases of conflicting rights
can also be justified by reference to concepts of third-party harms154 and
dignitary harms, as will be explained below.
Proportionality analyses, like the ones used in resolving Canadian
rights-conflict cases, are all about utilitarian weighing of harms and
benefits. In more straightforward cases, the deciding court’s task of
summing the harms and benefits, and ruling so as to maximize net benefits
and minimize net harms, is clear. The Niqab Case comes close to being
this type of straightforward case, where fair trial Charter rights of two
known co-accused were in conflict with the religious freedom Charter
right of a known witness, and where it would have been possible to hear
evidence from all concerned parties as to the impact of a decision on their
rights. These straightforward cases involve consideration of basic thirdparty harms; that is, they are concerned not only with harms and benefits
as between the government and the individual rights claimant in the case,
but also with harms that other people (third parties) might experience if
the rights claimant were to prevail.155 These cases also tend to deal with
variants of harm that are not particularly controversial or difficult to
recognize—like the material harm of being convicted for an offence after
an unfair trial (as in the Niqab Case).
Other cases are far less straightforward because of complicating thirdparty harm issues. First, even though there may not be a specifically
identified third party whose circumstances are being assessed in the cases,
there may be a massive group of potential third parties whose rights would
be affected by the court’s decision. In such cases (like the SK Marriage
Reference, the MB Marriage Case, the ON Physician Case, and TWU BC),
courts are nonetheless willing to consider the harms that these groups will

154. Third-party harms involve shifting the burdens of one’s exercise of a right onto others.
In the United States, it is said that “[a]n important constitutional principle for mediating between
religious freedom and the public good is that religious accommodations should not shift substantial
harm to others” (Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman & Richard Schragger, “When Do Religious
Accommodations Burden Others?” in Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld, eds, The Conscience
Wars: Rethinking the Balance between Religion, Identity, and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2018) 328 at 329).
155. There is an abundance of commentary on the concept of third-party harms in American religious
freedom literature. See e.g. Jonathan C Lipson, “On Balance: Religious Liberty and Third-Party
Harms” (2000) 84:3 Minn L Rev 589; Kathleen A Brady, “Religious Accommodations and ThirdParty Harms: Constitutional Values and Limits” (2017) 106:4 Ky LJ 717; and, Stephanie H Barclay,
“First Amendment ‘Harms’” (2020) 95:2 Ind LJ 331.
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suffer and weigh them against the benefits that would accrue to religious
claimants if their rights were fully upheld.156
Given the utilitarian nature of proportionality assessments, the impact
of third-party harms on a case may be dispositive. To be clear, no Canadian
court has (to my knowledge) justified limits on freedom of religion, or
found against freedom of religion in a competing rights case, solely on the
basis of a numerical superiority of adversely affected third parties when
compared to positively affected religious rights claimants. However, it
stands to reason that the net harms will be counted as objectively higher
than the net benefits (in a way that sways the proportionality assessment)
if courts identify a large group of harmed third parties on one side of the
equation, and only a single benefitting rights claimant (or a small group of
benefitting claimants who have a narrow religious interest that they seek
to advance) on the other side of the equation.
It strikes me as entirely defensible and consistent with the concept of
proportionality to consider the interests of all the different people who will
be adversely affected by a claimant’s exercise of their religious rights, and
to aggregate this suffering on one side of the proportionality calculation.
The ideal proportionality assessment, in a world of perfect information,
would presumably take into account every individual rights-benefit and
rights-harm that would be caused by a decision—no matter how indirect
or remote—in order to make the most informed decision possible in terms
of its consequences.157 To take all reasonably foreseeable third-party harms
into account, instead of just the harms to known and identified third parties,
therefore seems to be a step toward this ideal proportionality assessment.
In the final analysis, as long as we accept that a utilitarian proportionality
assessment is the best (or least worst) mechanism for resolving rights
claims, then we ought to want these assessments to be informed by as
156. In the SK Marriage Reference, supra note 6 at para 96, for instance, the SKCA identified
“the gay and lesbian community at large,” “friends and families of gay and lesbian persons,” and
“members of the public” all as third parties who would suffer harm from upholding the religious rights
of marriage commissioners. In the ON Physician Case, supra note 6 at para 121, the ONCA identified
“patients with financial, social, educational or emotional challenges; patients who are old, young, poor
or addicted to drugs; patients with mental health challenges or physical or intellectual disabilities;
[and] patients facing economic, linguistic, cultural or geographic barriers,” among others, as third
parties whose rights would be harmed by upholding the religious rights of objecting physicians.
157. The challenge, of course, lies in the fact that perfect information is unavailable to real-world
judges; these individuals must instead identify, collect, and analyze (usually with the assistance of the
parties’ counsel) the best available (but always incomplete) information when weighing proportionality
claims. To complicate matters, the ideally neutral processes of identifying, collecting, and analyzing
information may actually be influenced by various biases that compromise neutrality and precipitate
more political than strictly legal decision-making (on this point, see Miller, supra note 34 at 385, and
New Jersey v TLO, supra note 37 at 369-370).
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many of the known or foreseeable consequences as possible—even if
taking all of these consequences into account tends to mean that religious
rights claimants will often need to compromise in cases involving conflicts
with other rights.
Although this consideration of third-party harms may seem to “stack
the deck” against religion in competing rights cases, and although such
third-party harms seem to have been influential in weighing against religion
within all of the cases discussed above in Part II, it is not necessarily the
case that non-religious third-party harms will always be greater than the
first-party harms experienced by religious claimants. In this sense, the
concept of third-party harms is rights-neutral: one would expect a court
to rule in favour of a religious right if failing to do so would cause major
harms to many religious adherents, in order to protect a small group of
third parties from minor harms. To offer a concrete example, it would
pervert the doctrine of third-party harms to require fifteen niqab-wearing
witnesses to unveil on the witness stand in order to protect the fair trial
rights of a man who is accused of a non-criminal motor vehicle offence:
the (third-party) harm to the single accused person in this non-criminal
case is just not as weighty as the (first-party) harm to the multiple religious
rights claimants.
Thus, consideration of third-party harms can justify rulings against
religious freedom in contemporary rights-conflict cases only because of
the ways in which religious claims manifest in these cases, not because of
some overarching rule of priority that subordinates religious harms to other
harms: the contemporary cases (including all of the cases discussed in Part
II, except the Niqab Case) often involve religiously based assertions, or
“complicity claims,”158 about how others should live their lives—and these
assertions have a harmful impact on large numbers of others who feel
shame and stigma when the religious claims are advanced or validated.159
Where this third-party effect of a religious claim is smaller or non-existent,
then there is clearly less ground for justifying a subordination of the
religious right to the other right at issue in the case.
However, it is not just the number of third-party harms that tends to
have impact in cases where freedom of religion is in tension with other
158. Cases wherein religious adherents claim that they have a right to refrain from doing anything that
would make them complicit in actions by others that they characterize as sinful are often referred to as
cases involving “complicity claims”: Sandra Fredman, “Tolerating the Intolerant: Religious Freedom,
Complicity, and the Right to Equality” (2020) 9:2 Oxford JL & Religion 305 at 305.
159. For a well-reasoned discussion of the stigmatizing harms that can be felt in this type of case—
addressing the TWU BC factual situation—see Elaine Craig, “TWU Law: A Reply to Proponents of
Approval” (2014) 37:2 Dal LJ 621, especially at 634-637 and 655-657.
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rights; it is also the nature of these harms, which often manifest as dignitary
harms (rather than as just material harms). In the cases discussed above in
Part II, one might characterize an LGBTQ couple’s challenges (in terms
of time, cost, and inconvenience) in finding a non-objecting marriage
commissioner, or a patient’s similar challenges in finding a non-objecting
physician, or a co-accused’s conviction after an unfair trial, or an LGBTQ
individual’s more limited access to law school seats when compared
to a married heterosexual individual, all as possible material costs
associated with upholding religious rights in each of the five respective
cases. Dignitary harms,160 in contrast, include suffering from shame and
stigma,161 a sense of isolation,162 being degraded or disrespected,163 and
other such harms,164 as seen in all the cases discussed in Part II except the
Niqab Case (where dignitary harms did not arise).165
NeJaime and Segal, in what remains probably the most relevant and
influential article on the subject of dignitary harms suffered by third parties
when religious adherents invoke religious freedom rights, argue that the
concept of dignitary harms first “became clear during the civil rights
movement, when denials of service at lunch counters were understood as
meaning-making transactions”166 intended to humiliate. These authors note
that the socially constructed meanings of refusals to serve (or to include,
etc.) in the context of religiously based complicity claims are harmful
to the dignity interests of others, as “actions that address third parties as
sinners in ways that can stigmatize and demean.”167 Additionally, in many
160. Such harms are also sometimes referred to as expressive harms: see generally Eva Brems,
“Objections to Antidiscrimination in the Name of Conscience or Religion: A Conflicting Rights
Approach” in Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld, eds, The Conscience Wars: Rethinking the
Balance between Religion, Identity, and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018)
277.
161. ON Physician Case, supra note 6 at paras 132-133.
162. TWU BC, supra note 6 at para 98.
163. Ibid at para 101.
164. For a thorough account of the different ways in which religious objections to the conduct
of others can create dignitary harms for women, see Louise Melling, “Religious Refusals and
Reproductive Rights: Claims of Conscience as Discrimination and Shaming” in Susanna Mancini &
Michel Rosenfeld, eds, The Conscience Wars: Rethinking the Balance between Religion, Identity, and
Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018) 375.
165. I have suggested here that dignitary harms did not arise in the Niqab Case mainly because
the concept, as described in this article, refers only to dignitary harms to others that result from a
rights-holder exercising their rights. Although the witness in the Niqab Case, N.S., likely had strong
dignitary interests (related to her religion, culture, and gender) that all motivated her efforts to testify
while wearing her niqab, her religious freedom claim would not likely have caused dignitary harms to
the accused persons who were on trial in that case.
166. Douglas Nejaime & Reva B Siegel, “Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in
Religion and Politics” (2015) 124:7 Yale LJ 2516 at 2574-2575.
167. Ibid at 2575-2576.
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cases, a religious claimant’s meaning is actually explicit and targeted, not
just socially constructed, in even more harmful ways. NeJaime and Segal
recount, for instance, the example of a same-sex couple who were refused
service at a bakery when the bakery owners told the couple, “[we] don’t
do same sex weddings because [we] are Christians and being gay is an
abomination.”168 They also recount the example of a mother of six children
who sought emergency contraception from a Walgreens pharmacist, and
who was refused assistance when the pharmacist reportedly told her,
“You’re a murderer! I will not help you kill this baby. I will not have the
blood on my hands.”169
In these cases, as in the SK Marriage Reference, the MB Marriage
Case, the ON Physician Case, and TWU BC, religious adherents act, or
seek a right to act, toward others in ways that signal how these others
are less worthy of consideration and respect—are less equally human—
because of their sins. In the ON Physician Case, the ONCA describes how
one of the objecting physicians refused to provide transition-related care
to a transgendered patient: the physician told the patient, “I believe that
God has created us male and female, and that choosing to change your
gender is working against how God has made you.”170 In the SK Marriage
Reference, the SKCA summarized the objections of numerous religious
intervenors who opposed the idea of same-sex marriages as follows: the
objecting commissioners believe that “a same-sex union is sinful (to put
it mildly—some also say unhealthy, perverse, etc.) and that to officiate in
the ceremony would give the appearance of approval of, and might serve
to encourage, such a sinful lifestyle.”171 The SKCA was quick to comment
that “to refuse to perform a same-sex marriage on this basis without doubt
expresses condemnation of same-sex unions and practices as socially
harmful and perverse.”172
Dignitary harms like these that materialize when religious adherents
communicate messages of rejection or disgust toward other marginalized
individuals in society are powerful and oppressive, in part because of the
legacy of discrimination that these other individuals have often tended
to face: “This harm is unlike that of a business turning away a customer

168. Ibid at 2576 (quoting Rachel C, “Review for Sweet Cakes” (17 January 2013), online: YELP
<www.yelp.com/user_details?userid=a4fuAn84fRddJTt7jJEo7g> [http://perma.cc/7VBA-CY7P]).
169. Ibid at 2576 (quoting National Women’s Law Center, “Pharmacy Refusals 101” (24 April 2012)
at 2, online (pdf): <nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/pharmacy_refusals_101_7_24_15_final_
clean_0.pdf> [http://perma.cc/4UJG-Z6PE]).
170. ON Physician Case, supra note 6 at para 141.
171. SK Marriage Reference, supra note 6 at para 140.
172. Ibid at para 142 (emphasis in original).
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merely for lack of appropriate attire, as this harm is set against a history
of discrimination.”173 Canadian courts, in the cases discussed above, have
recognized and seem to be influenced by this legacy of discrimination and
the accumulated harm that it has visited upon members of marginalized
groups.174 This recognition was particularly evident in the SK Marriage
Reference, wherein the SKCA noted not only that gays and lesbians
had faced historical discrimination in general,175 but more pointedly
that members of these communities had faced extensive discrimination
predominantly at the hands of religious adherents: “The evidence before
us clearly establishes that religious disapproval of same-sex relationships
is hardly restricted to marriage commissioners. Indeed, it is fair to say
that religious belief is at the root of much if not most of the historical
discrimination against gays and lesbians.”176
It is perhaps an unacknowledged recognition of this relationship
between religion and historical discrimination against certain marginalized
groups in other cases (specifically, TWU BC and the ON Physician Case)
that causes the courts in these cases to forcefully discuss, and seemingly
place significant weight upon, the dignitary harms that marginalized
individuals would suffer if the religious rights in the cases were fully
protected.177 Equality-related dignitary harms just seem to count for more
in the proportionality analyses than many of the material harms that a
religious claimant might experience if their rights were not protected,
and than almost all of the spiritual harms that they might experience (but
that are seldom meaningfully discussed by the courts, perhaps because
these harms cannot be explained by reference to public reason, as I have
suggested above).
In many ways, it is appropriate for dignitary harms to weigh
heavily in proportionality calculations. A material harm (e.g., an extra
financial cost) can be conceptually and practically offset (e.g., by an
award of human rights damages) in many cases without overwhelming
or enduring consequences. The costs of suffering dignitary harms are less
clear, may endure for longer periods, and are perhaps incapable of ever
being offset. Being told by a religious service provider at a critical point in
one’s life (e.g., at the time of marriage, or when in need of serious medical
173. Marvin Lim & Louise Melling, “Inconvenience or Indignity? Religious Exemptions to Public
Accommodations Laws” (2014) 22:2 JL & Pol’y 705 at 721.
174. See e.g. ONCA Physician Case, supra note 6 at para 123.
175. SK Marriage Reference, supra note 6 at para 45: “The historical marginalization and mistreatment
of gay and lesbian individuals is well known.”
176. Ibid at para 145 (emphasis added).
177. TWU BC, supra note 6 at para 101; ON Physician Case, supra note 6 at para 123.

Explaining the Phenomenon of Religious Losses in
Contemporary Canadian Constitutional Cases…

35

attention) that one’s identity is so repugnant that the service provider must
refuse assistance is potentially so damaging to individual dignity that one
will never fully overcome the harm. In this sense, an emerging judicial
recognition of weighty dignitary harms in conflicting rights cases that
involve freedom of religion is entirely appropriate and consistent with the
underlying rationale of proportionality assessments.
3. The special importance of emerging and emancipation rights
A final justification that can be offered for the pattern of religious losses
in contemporary rights-conflict cases—despite the conceptually equal
status of religious freedom alongside other Charter rights—draws upon
the concept of emerging or emancipation rights and sketches out a special
place of importance for these rights in particular contexts.
Emancipation rights, according to Brems, are a distinct set of antidiscrimination and autonomy rights that are “intended to correct a legacy
of structural discrimination of specific groups and to provide to members
of such groups equal opportunities and equal enjoyment of their human
rights. Concretely, these include among others women’s rights, children’s
rights, the rights of ethnic and cultural minorities, the rights of persons
with disabilities, and LGBT rights.”178 The basic premise behind Brems’
concept of emancipation rights is that formal legal change often precedes
more meaningful and necessary cultural change in relation to equality
rights and non-discrimination.179 Because of this reality, Brems argues,
legal institutions must privilege emancipation rights over other rights
during the periods when culture change lags behind legal change, if other
options are unable to resolve rights conflicts in specific cases.180
Brems’ theory is simple and intuitive. It also fits nicely within the
broader utilitarian proportionality framework. Consider, for instance, the
difference between the following two scenarios: (1) a right for an individual,
whose rights have never been in serious jeopardy, is fully upheld; and
(2) a right for an individual, whose rights have historically been disregarded,
and whose rights continue to be regularly challenged or undermined, is
fully upheld. In comparing these scenarios, it is important to acknowledge
that the incremental value of one additional act of rights-recognition is
not going to be equal in every case, because the appreciation of goods in
life tends to follow the law of diminishing marginal utility.181 Thus, the
178. Brems, supra note 160 at 278.
179. Ibid at 277-278.
180. Ibid at 302.
181. Herbert Hovenkamp, “Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem” (1990) 75:4 Cornell L Rev 783
at 798: “Most people probably experience declining marginal utility of income—each dollar added to
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greatest incremental benefit here will probably result from scenario (2),
because the value of one additional act of rights-recognition will tend to be
higher for individuals whose rights enjoy less respect as a starting point.
In Canadian conflicting rights cases wherein religious individuals who
form part of dominant or more powerful groups attempt to assert religious
claims against individuals who form part of historically mistreated groups,
the rights of the latter individuals would be emancipation rights that Brems
suggests should be protected as a priority under her theory, and they would
also be rights that tend to yield the greatest incremental benefit as a matter
of utilitarian (and marginal utility) theory when they are protected.
The analysis that flows from consideration of emancipation rights in
these two scenarios (which obviously track the factual circumstances of
the SK Marriage Reference, the MB Marriage Case, TWU BC, and, to
a possibly lesser extent, the ON Physician Case) does not suggest that
freedom of religion is a lesser right than other rights in all contexts. Rather,
it simply suggests that freedom of religion (for the predominantly Christian
rights claimants in the cases just mentioned) is the more historically wellestablished and protected right when compared to the equality rights of
LGBTQ community members, seriously disabled patients who seek
medical assistance in dying,182 or other similarly disadvantaged people
whose rights were at stake in those particular cases. In these specific
contexts, there are strong arguments, as a matter of both emancipation
rights theory and utility/utilitarian theory, to privilege the emerging right
over the established right. Courts should not shy away from relying on these
justifications that weigh against religious freedom rights in certain cases:
“[e]xplicitly acknowledging that the rights of one party will be diminished
in order to protect the rights of the other may be uncomfortable but should
result in more transparent decision-making, with a truer accounting of the
costs and benefits involved.”183
However, courts must also guard against any kind of routinization
of the privileging of non-religious rights over religious rights. For
instance, the minority religious rights of a group that seeks to use a park
for communal outdoor prayer are perhaps far less protected as a general
their wealth gives them a marginally lower level of individual satisfaction than a previous dollar.”
182. Although I am suggesting here that seriously disabled patients may have an equality-based right
to access MAiD, it is worth noting that some disability advocacy groups have suggested the opposite:
that the equality rights of seriously disabled individuals are violated when society permits these
individuals to access MAiD. See e.g. Inclusion Canada, “Press Release: MAiD Bill Violates Equality
Rights of People with Disabilities” (28 February 2020), online: <inclusioncanada.ca/2020/02/28/
medical-assistance-in-dying-bill-violates-equality-rights-of-people-with-disabilities-it-must-bestopped/> [perma.cc/P7SR-BL9T].
183. Ginn & Kindred, supra note 105 at 20.
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matter than the free expression rights of non-religious right-wing group
members who seek to use the same park for a public protest against any
immigration policy that allows members of the religious minority to enter
Canada. In such a case, the emerging or emancipation right is clearly the
religious right, and it should justifiably be accorded a measure of privilege
as a result.
Conclusion
This article does not make any single deep claim; rather, it attempts to
establish a series of relatively shallow factual, theoretical, and legal
claims in sequence, in an effort to build a final argument that is novel
and perhaps controversial in what it suggests. The first claim is that a
utilitarian proportionality framework, notwithstanding the many flaws that
one might find with it, is nonetheless a logical and legitimate framework
for resolving Canadian fundamental rights cases. The second claim is that,
when proportionality analyses of different types are actually applied to
difficult Canadian cases at the level of appeal courts and the SCC, we
see that Canadian courts place freedom of religion conceptually on par
with all other Charter rights, but also that Canadian courts tend to require
freedom of religion to yield in specific cases when this right conflicts with
other Charter rights and values. The final (and potentially most disruptive)
claim is that this tendency to value freedom of religion equally with other
rights in the abstract while subordinating it to other rights in numerous
concrete cases is justifiable by reference to concepts of public reason,
third-party and dignitary harms, and the special importance of emerging
human rights.
One problem with building an argument from sequential claims as
I have done in this article is that, if one of the early claims fails, then
the foundation for the remainder of the argument is compromised. Along
these lines, one might suggest that this entire article is really just a longwinded defence of utilitarianism in general, and that the article’s claims
must all be rejected if one does not subscribe to a utilitarian world
view. I would like to think that the claims advanced in this article are
much narrower and more nuanced than simply being justifications for
the adoption of a wholesale utilitarian world view. This article takes no
position on the merits of utilitarianism as a comprehensive normative
ethical theory. To the extent that it endorses a utilitarian approach, the
endorsement should be understood as applying only to proportionality
assessments used to resolve rights claims—and even then, only because
no superior mechanism for resolving such claims has yet been developed.
If we accept that utilitarian proportionality assessments represent the most
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workable general framework for resolving rights claims, at least until a
more widely-accepted framework comes along, then the foundation upon
which this article rests is solidly intact.
However, there is more at stake here when we discuss controversial
matters of religious freedom than just questions about how logically
sound, or robust, one’s argument might be. The potential for unintended
wounds and further polarization runs high in such discussions. And so, just
as Rawls’ concept of public reason strives to promote reconciliation within
a society characterized by the fact of reasonable pluralism,184 I aspire
within this article to present a justification for religion’s losing tendency in
contemporary Canadian case law that is capable of being accepted by all
of Canadian society. When I argue here that the results in contemporary
Canadian rights-conflict cases are justifiable, this is not because religious
rights, or religious people, are somehow less deserving of equal respect
and consideration than other rights or people. Rather, it is because I believe
that Canadian law has settled upon a fair general framework for resolving
rights claims in a diverse society (the proportionality framework), and that
when this framework is applied to the types of religious rights cases that
seem to find themselves before the courts today, the balance of harms will
often disfavour the religious rights. These outcomes are not likely to be
embraced by religious rights claimants on the losing side in any particular
case. However, it might provide some comfort to religious adherents to
consider how the justifications that have been advanced in this article
could be used to their advantage in different cases to protect their own
rights. For instance, encroachments upon their religious rights that cannot
be framed in terms of public legal reason should be prohibited; likewise,
proportionality assessments should weigh in favour of religious rights
claimants if they suffer large third-party or dignitary harms collateral
to another individual’s exercise of a fundamental right, and the special
significance of religious freedom as an emerging or emancipation right
could be invoked under appropriate circumstances in order to protect
religious rights in priority over other rights.
In many ways, then, it is important for all of us to understand the
justifications for the losing phenomenon in contemporary Canadian
religious freedom case law. On the one hand, secular society must
remember that religious rights are conceptually worthy of equal protection
and respect alongside other rights, and that religious rights will not be
compromised by the courts except in extreme cases (like the ones that
seem to end up in front of appeal courts and the SCC) wherein exercises of
184. Rawls, supra note 123 at 4.
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the religious rights would cause disproportionate harm. On the other hand,
all of society would likely benefit if religious adherents truly believed that
adjudication of their rights claims can happen in accordance with fair and
legitimate principles that the religious adherents can accept. By thinking
about the justifications for contemporary religious freedom losses, and
how these these justifications might change or disappear entirely if only
a few facts in each case were to change, perhaps some small measure
of reconciliation or rapprochement on this divisive topic can be achieved
within Canadian society. It is a modest hope—but one that should not be
abandoned.
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